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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A
WOMEN'S ISSUE
HEL NORTON
Good morning. I'd like to focus this morning on women's
stake in the debate over affirmative action, a subject that gets al-
most no discussion in the policy discourse, the media coverage, or
even in the case law. I'd like to talk about why affirmative action is
important to women and why its impact on women deserves more
attention. I'll also speculate a little about some of the reasons why
women's interests in this debate have so far received so little
attention.
Let me start with the Supreme Court and ask, for example,
what Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penal means for women. W hat is
the post-Adarand standard of review for gender-based affirmative ac-
tion programs? Adarand itself does not address the appropriate
level of constitutional review for such programs. As you probably
know, Adarand holds that any race-based classification by the fed-
eral government, including affirmative action, is subject to strict
scrutiny.2 In other words, it must be necessary to achieve a compel-
ling government interest.
3
However, there is no Supreme Court case law on the constitu-
tionality of gender-based affirmative action programs. In fact, the
only holding in the area is a Title VII case, Johnson v. Transportalion
Agency, 4 which I'll talk about a little later on. In the absence of
Supreme Court guidance, most folks assume (as Justice Stevens did
in his dissent in Adarand) that if the Court is serious about a com-
mitment to "consistency" in its equal protection jurisprudence,
then intermediate scrutiny must apply to gender-based affirmative
action just as it does to invidious gender discrimination. Intermedi-
ate scrutiny has been applied to gender-based classifications by gov-
ernment since the Court decided Craig v. Boren5 in 1976.
Intermediate scrutiny requires that gender-based classifications by
Helen Norton is Director of Equal Opportunity Programs, Women's Legal
Defense Fund.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. Id. at 2113.
3. Id.
4. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
5. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
373
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
1995 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
the government be substantially related to an important govern-
ment interest.
6
The theory, in other words, is that since Adarand-and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.7 before it-conclude that strict scrutiny
applies to any governmental use of race-based classifications, re-
gardless of whether such use is motivated by invidious or benign
intentions, intermediate scrutiny should apply to remedial gender-
based programs, just as it does to invidious gender classifications.
And, in fact, that is what most lower courts have decided in the
wake of Croson (which, in 1989, applied strict scrutiny to all race-
based classifications by state and local governments).
Note, however, what this means. Due to the difference be-
tween intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, it is now easier for
governments to engage in invidious gender discrimination against
women than to engage in race-based affirmative action programs.
To take one example, it's easier for a state to exclude women from
state-sponsored military schools than to establish a race-based af-
firmative action program designed to remedy proven invidious ra-
cial discrimination.
Note also the especially interesting anomaly in the Sixth Cir-
cuit, which is the source of a great deal of case law of concern to
civil rights attorneys. In two separate post-Croson decisions, the
Sixth Circuit has held that gender-based affirmative action pro-
grams are subject to strict scrutiny.8 So, it's easier for the state gov-
ernments of Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, and Kentucky to expressly
discriminate against women invidiously than it is for those same
states to defend affirmative action programs designed to correct sex
discrimination.
These anomalies are pretty hard to justify, and they demon-
strate some of the problems with the Court's current equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. In fact, it is entirely possible that this term the
Court will re-examine the constitutional standards that apply gener-
ally to sex discrimination when it takes up United States v. Virginia.,
In that case, the Department ofJustice is bringing an equal protec-
tion challenge to Virginia's sponsorship of the Virginia Military In-
stitute (VMI), a school that excludes women because they are
women, regardless of their qualifications. Note that the Court has
never foreclosed the possibility of applying strict scrutiny to gen-
6. Id. at 197.
7. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
8. Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 404 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1190 (1994); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989).
9. 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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der.10 In fact, a plurality of fourjustices supported the use of strict
scrutiny in 1973, in Frontiero v. Richardson.II If the Court uses the
VMI case to hold that strict scrutiny should apply to gender-based
classifications, then the anomalies that I've mentioned would
disappear.
Let me switch now from the case law to the policy debate, an-
other forum that has been virtually silent with respect to women
and affirmative action. I'll start by talking about affirmative action's
importance in creating opportunities for women, who, because of
their gender and in spite of their merit, have historically been de-
nied opportunities. It's important to recognize our long national
history of discrimination, and our comparatively short commitment
to equal opportunity and anti-discrimination. I think understand-
ing this history is key to understanding affirmative action's continu-
ing relevance to the lives of American women.
You all know that women have historically been cut off from
educational opportunities, and trapped into lower-paying, sex-seg-
regated jobs-discouraged, for example, from pursuing fields like
medicine, business, or the skilled trades. As late as 1968, for exam-
ple, newspapers and employers routinely segregated "Help
Wanted" ads by gender, with one section advertising the better-pay-
ing jobs only for men and a separate section listing women's jobs,
thus systematically excluding women from key opportunities with-
out regard for their qualifications. While some of these most bla-
tant forms of discrimination have dissipated with time and
aggressive law enforcement, sex discrimination remains all too
prevalent.
It's important to note that despite centuries of discrimination,
Title VII, the federal law barring job discrimination, is barely thirty
years old. And, in fact, Title VII's protections against sex discrimi-
nation came about only by a historic accident-12 Federal laws ban-
10. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 n.6 (1994) (discussing "height-
ened scrutiny" for gender and holding that peremptory challenges based on gen-
der violate the Equal Protection Clause); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan.
458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (discussing applicable level of scrutiny and holding that a
state's exclusion of males from a nursing school violates the Equal Protection
Clause); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. CL 367, 372-73 (1993) (Gins-
burgJ., concurring) (arguing that an "objectively" hostile or abusive work environ-
ment violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
11. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
12. The statute's protections for women resulted from a political miscalcula-
tion by southern segregationists seeking to break Congress' determination to pro-
hibit race discrimination. In 1964, the segregationists gambled that even the most
ardent civil rights advocates would balk at passing Title VII if it meant opening up
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ning sex discrimination in education date only to 1972,13 and less
than 25 years have passed since the Supreme Court first recognized
that governmental sex discrimination is indeed unconstitutional. 14
As recently as 1961, a unanimous Supreme Court that included Earl
Warren and William Brennan upheld Florida's policy of exempting
women from jury duty, reasoning that a "woman is still regarded as
the center of home and family life," 15 and presumably not of public
life and community decision-making.
Given our short history of a national commitment to equal op-
portunity, sex discrimination's continuing force is not surprising. A
few recent examples from the case law also make clear how discrim-
ination continues to limit women's opportunities. For example, a
federal judge in California found that a major grocery store chain
routinely segregated women and people of color into low-wage,
dead-end jobs while hiring white men for jobs that led to manage-
ment opportunities. Women and people of color were denied ac-
cess to critical training programs and were steered against their
wishes into part-time rather than full-time jobs.16 In another exam-
ple, a District of Columbia federal court found that Price
Waterhouse, the major accounting firm, refused to promote a wo-
man to partnership, even though she had generated millions of dol-
lars more revenue than any other candidate to be considered for
partnership that year. The reason: she wasn't considered suffi-
ciently feminine. 1
7
Social science studies further document sex discrimination's
continued vitality. Last year, for example, the National Bureau of
Economic Research sent equally qualified pairs of male and female
applicants to seekjobs at a range of Philadelphia restaurants. Their
audit found that high-priced restaurants that offered good jobs,
employment opportunities to women as well as to people of color. On the last day
of the House debate on the Civil Rights Act, segregationist Rep. Howard W. Smith,
a Virginia Democrat, offered an amendment adding sex discrimination to the
types of discrimination prohibited. Fortunately, he underestimated congressional
determination to enact civil rights legislation, and the bill became law as amended,
with the prohibition on sex discrimination essentially an afterthought. See Willing-
ham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing
Peter F. Ziegler, Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 965, 968 (1973), and Note, Developments in the
Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1109, 1167 (1971)). See also 110 CoNG. R~c. 2577 (1964).
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 168 (West Supp. 1990).
14. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
16. Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 332-35 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
17. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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with decent pay and good tips, were twice as likely to offer jobs to
the male applicants over their equally qualified female
counterparts. 1$
The not-so-surprising result of this ongoing discrimination is
that white men still dominate most upper-level managerial jobs.
Folks are probably pretty familiar with the statistics.19 Not surpris-
ingly, men are more likely to be high wage earners than women.20
Qualified women consistently earn less than their male counter-
parts, and, in fact, they don't receive the same return on their in-
vestment in education.21 As a result, women are painfully aware
that merit still too often takes a back seat to discrimination.
Now, affirmative action seeks to try to prevent discrimination
before it happens, by urging institutions to scrutinize their decision-
making practices for stereotyping and other discriminatory actions.
Affirmative action also enables institutions to correct discrimination
once the infraction has been identified. In other words, the pro-
grams are designed to counter the discrimination that too often
taints decisions about education, business, and job opportunities.
In great part because of programs like these, women have made
significant progress in recent years. Women do earn more. In 1963
18. DAVID NEuliARK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION IN RESTAURANT HIRING: AN
AUDIT STUDY (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5024,
February 1995).
19. Women and people of color make up less than 5 percent of senior manag-
ers in Fortune 1500 companies, even though women are 46 percent and people of
color are 21 percent of the national workforce. FEDERAL GLASS CEIUNG CO.1,s-
SION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HuNfA CprrA.
(1995).
20. In 1994, 16 percent of white men were high wage earners, meaning they
earned more than $50,000 a year. Only 4 percent of white women, less than 2
percent of black women, and less than 2 percent of Hispanic women earned as
much. Conversely, only 12 percent of white men were low wage earners, earning
less than $13,000 per year, compared to 21 percent of white women, 27 percent of
black women, and 37 percent of Hispanic women. U.S. CENSUS BUREU, THE
EARNINGS LADDER: WHO'S AT THE BorroM? WHO'S AT THE Top?, STATiSCA. BRIEF
(June 1994).
21. College-educated Hispanic women annually earn $1,600 less than white
men who have only high school diplomas. They earn nearly $16,000 less than
college-educated white men. College-educated black women earn only $1,500
more than white men with high school diplomas, and $13,000 less than college-
educated white men. College-educated white women earn $3,000 more a year
than white men with high school diplomas, and $12,000 less than white men with
college degrees. U.S. Census Bureau, 1993 Current Population Survey, Table 15,
Educational Attainment-Total Money Earnings in 1993 of Persons 25 Years Old
and Over, by Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex, and Work Experience in 1993 (un-
published tabulations on file with the Annual Survey of American Law).
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women earned $0.59 for every dollar earned by men. Today, wo-
men earn on average $0.72 for every white male dollar.22 More wo-
men are in the pipeline for top jobs. In 1980, for example, women
were 27 percent of all middle and upper managers. By 1990, this
number had increased to 35 percent.23 This is progress, but it's
obviously far short of parity.
In short, affirmative action has proven an important tool in
opening doors for qualified women. And it's important to realize
that, as a result, women do have an enormous stake in this debate.
Rolling back these programs would prematurely abandon a rela-
tively short commitment to women's equality.
Affirmative action is also important to women because it strives
to create an environment where merit can thrive and succeed. It
allows qualified women to compete fairly for decentjobs and educa-
tional opportunities. Professor Roger Wilkins summed this up
when he described affirmative action as a process designed to en-
courage institutions to develop fair and realistic criteria for assess-
ing merit, and then to recruit a diverse mix of individuals qualified
to take advantage of those opportunities.24 Opponents of affirma-
tive action too often mischaracterize these programs as the enemy
of merit. I think it's worth taking a couple of minutes to talk about
why this isn't so. I'd like to outline some of the broad principles
that make clear that folks who try to set up the debate as one be-
tween affirmative action and a commitment to excellence are mis-
stating what's really going on. In a string of cases that has spanned
nearly two decades-most recently in Adarand-the Supreme Court
has made clear that lawful affirmative action in no way permits quo-
tas, reverse discrimination, or favorable treatment of unqualified
women and minorities. The Court has consistently made clear that
gender or race can be taken into account to expand opportunities
for qualified women and people of color. In the words of Justice
Blackmun, "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take ac-
count of race."25 And as Justice O'Connor emphasized in Adarand,
"[tuhe unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
22. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, SERIES P-60, No. 189
(1994).
23. INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, IMPACGr OF THE GLASS CEILING
AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE ON MINORITIES AND WOMEN (based on 1980 and 1990
U.S. Census data), cited in press release, The Feminist Majority Foundation, Key
Findings of Women's Equality Poll (May 15, 1995).
24. Roger Wilkins, The Case for Affirmative Action, NATION, March 27, 1995, at
409.
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
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effects of racial discrimination against minorities in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from act-
ing in response to it. " 26 The same is true for sexism.
The Supreme Court has developed a number of safeguards to
ensure that affirmative action programs are justifiable. First, there
has to be a sufficiently strong reason for the program. The Court
has approved programs designed to correct actual discrimination
or to respond voluntarily to a serious under-representation of wo-
men in the workforce. In the sole Supreme Court decision cover-
ing gender-based programs under Title VII, Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, the Court upheld an employer's affirmative
action plan that allowed gender to be considered as a "plus-factor"
when choosing between qualified candidates for jobs in which wo-
men were seriously under-represented. 27 The employer developed
this plan, and the Court deemed it justified, because, after review,
the employer found that no women were employed or had ever
been employed in any of its 238 skilled craft positions.
2 8
Lawful affirmative action programs may be based on other ra-
tionales as well. For example, in Bakke, Justice Powell noted that a
university's educational interest in attaining a diverse student body
could justify appropriate affirmative action programs for school
admissions.29
The Court's second safeguard is the principle that affirmative
action programs must apply only to qualified candidates. The
Court has never wavered in its insistence that affirmative action
must only apply to persons who are qualified for the opportunities
in question. In doing this analysis, the Court has recognized that
several qualified candidates commonly present varying mixtures of
experience, skills, and credentials, so that no single candidate is
clearly the most qualified. For example, in the Johnson case, both
Paul Johnson, the male plaintiff claiming reverse discrimination,
and Diane Joyce, the woman who received the promotion, had the
requisite four years experience.30 Ms. Joyce's experience was more
recent and arguably more relevant; Mr. Johnson received a score of
75 to Ms. Joyce's 73 in the graded oral interview, where 70 was the
26. 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
27. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38.
28. Id. at 621.
29. 438 U.S. at 311-12. For assessments of the permissible rationales to sup-
port affirmative action programs under current case law, see Michael Small, 1995
ANN. SURV. AMi. L. 445; and Tanya Murphy, Note, 1995 ANN. Sut,. Am. L 515
(arguing that the diversity rationale remains viable in higher education).
30. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 623.
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threshold of eligibility.31 The Court upheld the county's use of Ms.
Joyce's gender as a positive factor in choosing between these two
qualified candidates, especially since no woman had ever held the
position in question.
32
Finally, the Court's third limiting principle is that affirmative
action programs must be narrowly tailored. Rigid and inflexible
quotas are not allowed. Programs may use numerical goals to mea-
sure progress in expanding opportunities, but only where there is a
demonstrated link between the goals and the availability of quali-
fied women and people of color in the relevant pool. The pro-
grams must also be flexible and temporary, and must respect the
rights of men and whites. Programs cannot require, for example,
that male workers be discharged to make way for female workers.
Nor, as the court ruled in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,33 can
a public employer lay off more senior white workers to protect the
jobs of less senior black workers.
In short, the Supreme Court has developed principles to en-
sure that affirmative action is justifiable and fair. It has consistently
struck down programs that disregard these principles. In this man-
ner, affirmative action creates a climate where qualified women and
men can fairly compete and excel.
In fact, affirmative action programs have opened doors for
qualified white men too. For example, in 1994, women-owned busi-
nesses generated more jobs in the United States-employing wo-
men, people of color, and white men-than the Fortune 500
companies worldwide. 34 Similarly, affirmative action programs de-
veloped in response to racial or gender discrimination have created
new job training opportunities for white men. For example, the
affirmative action program developed in United Steelworkers v.
Weber35 created equal numbers of new training slots for black and
white workers, thus generating opportunities for white workers that
wouldn't have existed absent the employer's commitment to affirm-
ative action.
All in all, women have an enormous stake in the outcome of
the current debate over affirmative action. And it's thus essential
31. Id.
32. Id. at 623-25.
33. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
34. NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN BUSINESS OWNERS, WOMEN-OWNID
BUSINESS: BREAKING THE BOUNDAMES (1995), cited in Sharon Hadary & Julie
Weeks, Women-Owned Businesses: A Growing Force in the Economy, WASH. POST, Oct.
17, 1995, at A17.
35. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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that they're included in this discussion. At the center of the debate
is the fundamental struggle over what affirmative action really
means. Poll after poll concludes that Americans firmly support af-
firmative action to create opportunities for women and people of
color, while they vigorously oppose quotas and preferences for un-
qualified candidates3
6
Not surprisingly, opponents of affirmative action have at-
tempted to redefine affirmative action as a synonym for these de-
spised quotas and preferences, even though, as we'vejust discussed,
these practices are dearly not components of lawful affirmative ac-
tion. At the same time, this debate has been structured by some
opponents of affirmative action-and eagerly joined by much of
the media-as a series of false choices and polarizing divisions:
black against white, male against female, affirmative action against
merit and excellence.
I believe these opponents have often purposely centered their
attacks on race-based affirmative action to capitalize on racial fears
and divisions. Their failure to address women's stake in this debate
demonstrates their ignorance of, or indifference to, women's con-
tinuing quest for equality. For example, Senator Dole and others
have based their rhetorical attacks on affirmative action almost ex-
clusively on so-called racial preferences, without any reference to
gender.3 7 But their legislative proposals would sweep away all af-
firmative action programs. Last summer I appeared on a panel
with a former Reagan Administration official who, in his 20-minute
attack on affirmative action, referred exclusively to so-called "racial
preferences" without a single mention of women and their stake in
the debate.38 I think it's important to ask why this is so.
I believe that some opponents of affirmative action focus exclu-
sively on race in their rhetoric-even though their policy proposals
would eviscerate all affirmative action programs-because they
think it makes good copy and good politics. With respect to good
copy, exploiting racial fears over affirmative action generates the
sort of inflammatory magazine covers that many of you may have
seen. For example, the cover of a recent issue of U.S. News &
World Report highlighted the phrase, "No White Men Need Ap-
36. See, &g., Affirmative Action: The Public Reaction, USA TODAY, March 24,
1995, at Al (reporting results of USA Today/CNN Gallup poll).
37. See; e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S3939 (March 15, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole);
141 CONG. REc. S10829 (July 27, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
38. American Bar Association, "Affirmative Action-IMIU It Survive the Current
Lega4 Socia4 and Political Environment?", panel presentation at the Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association (Chicago August 9, 1995).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
1995 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
ply."39 An issue of Newsweek featured a cover photo of black and
white fists clashing.
40
With respect to politics, I think that some opponents look at
the number of women voters and the demonstrably smaller number
of voters of color, and conclude that race-baiting is politically wiser
than gender-bashing. They follow this up with the strategy of using
buzzwords and horror stories to exploit the fears of white voters.
I think it's important for us, as we continue this discussion, to
take a careful look at the opponents' rhetoric and to expose the
false choices that are too often expressed in this debate. In playing
to the racial fears of white voters, a number of affirmative action
opponents are seeking to capitalize on the very real economic anxi-
ety that most Americans feel. And, in fact, there's good reason for
Americans to have this sort of economic insecurity. They wonder,
rightfully, whether there will be enough decent jobs and educa-
tional opportunities for themselves and their families. But we need
to be honest about the fact that affirmative action is not the cause
of the economic conditions that create this sort of insecurity, and
that ending affirmative action tomorrow would not do a thing to
end this anxiety. It may be true that some opponents of affirmative
action are using the debate to divert attention and energy from the
much tougher problems of how to create good jobs and how to
educate and train folks to take advantage of good opportunities.
All in all, it's important that during this debate we refuse to suc-
cumb to these sorts of false choices that seek to pit American
against American, scapegoating women and people of color for eco-
nomically difficult times. We need to recognize just how much is at
stake here for women: the chance to compete fairly for good jobs
and decent educational and business opportunities. In this debate,
we need to insist that the discussion fully address women's stake in
the outcome. Thanks very much.
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U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 13, 1995, at cover.
40. Howard Fineman, Race and Rage, NEwswEEK, April 3, 1995, at cover.
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